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TThe community-level commitment to the introduction of the single currency emerged at the Maastricht summit in december 1991, which is also where the rules of the launch of the single currency were established by the 
participants of the european Council (Farkas, 
Várnay, 2011). However, the markets started 
to really believe that the monetary union 
would be realised only after the 1995 Madrid 
eu summit. By then, the establishment of the 
eurosystem had been started – through the 
european Monetary institute (Lámfalussy et 
al, 2014) –, the eMR crisis was successfully 
overcome as well, and the convergence phase 
was in progress. Thus, the interests of the 
government securities of the eu Member 
States started to move downwards, and a 
dynamic convergence started to the German 
interests, which was usually the lowest in the 
eu (see Figure 1). 
The 1999 launch of the euro was success-
ful, which – of course – was supported by the 
period of favourable economic boom as well. 
The first ten years continued the same, which 
gave rise to justifiable contentment and con-
fidence. The interest rates stayed low, and a 
massive investment boom was realised on the 
periphery. The situation changed quickly: as 
a result of the global financial crisis, a liquid-
ity crisis emerged in europe suddenly, and 
then – as a consequence of managing the cri-
sis –, the public funds crisis in a fairly short 
amount of time. The interest rates which had 
been low for years increased sharply on the 
periphery of the eurozone, and the interest 
differences suddenly climbed to historical 
heights (Figure 1, starting from 2009). dur-
ing the crisis of the eurozone, all the imper-
fections of the economic and Monetary un-
ion (eMu) came to light. during the initial 
period, seeking solutions consisted of meas-
ures financed by public funds; however, these 
had mostly an emergency response character, 
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and planning was not typical. The oppor-
tunity for more thought-out reforms arose 
from around 2013/2014 – at the same time, 
the economic situation loosened the previous 
pressure of change (the only exceptions may 
be the Baltic States, which complied with the 
Maastricht convergence criteria and acceded 
to the monetary zone during the years of the 
crisis). 
The crisis induced deep social and politi-
cal changes as well, primarily in the directions 
of euroscepticism and opposition to the ex-
isting regime (Serricchio et al., 2013, Nicoli 
2017, Pirro, taggart, 2018) – which affects 
the feasibility of the further development and 
reforms of the eMu. in addition to the chal-
lenges, key eurozone countries (in particular, 
Germany and France) represent very different 
opinions in some crucial matters, as well as 
the economic and public funds situation of 
the third largest economy of the eurozone – 
italy – is not reassuring at all. 
METhOd
in our study we review how the eurozone has 
changed since the beginnings, and relying on 
the present condition thereof, to what extent is 
the completion of the GMu structure feasible 
to the appropriate level, and thus, essentially 
the sustainability of the entire currency 
union. in the course of our analysis, we rely 
on theoretical considerations and debates – 
in respect of the design, establishment, crisis 
management and the formation of the future 
of the eMu –, as well as on the descriptive 
and at the same time, critical presentation of 
the developments, supported by the relevant 
literature. Furthermore, we aim at presenting 
Figure 1
Long-term interest rates in each euro-area country,  
January 1993 – august 2018
Source: Edited by the authors based on ECB data
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each significant event and the effects thereof 
objectively – as intended – and at the same 
time, in a nuanced manner. With respect to 
the present and the future, we refer to the 
specialised press (The economist, Bloomberg) 
and the institutional press conferences (eCB), 
as well as to plans published on various forums, 
which are not scientific, but rather can be 
interpreted as political programmes (Macron-
Gabriel manifesto, Macron plan, Meseberg 
declaration), in addition to the documents 
of the european Committee (presidential 
reports, White Paper on the future of europe).
ThE OrIgINal CONCEPTs  
aNd ThE INITIal PErIOd
The idea of the european monetary integration 
first emerged at the 1969 Hague Summit (J. 
Nagy 2007), and it was related to the fact that 
the unsustainability of the Bretton Woods 
system had been very apparent by then. The 
eeC Member States – among whom the 
economic-trade relations had been expanding 
dynamically for the more than the previous 
decade and owing to the common market 
– thought the time had come to establish 
a monetary system among them and they 
should no longer manage their transactions 
with each other within a dollar-centred global 
financial system (Zimmermann, 2001). The 
Werner – which was plan published in 1970 – 
outlined the steps of this european monetary 
integration, with the monetary union as the 
final destination (eC 1970). in the framework 
of the implementation of the plan, the europe-
an Monetary Cooperation Fund was founded 
in 1973 (Regulation (eeC) No 907/73), 
while the european Monetary System (eMS) 
was launched in 1979, with eCu being the 
central unit of account (Regulation (eeC) No 
3181/78). The next milestone was the report 
of the technical commission lead by Jacques 
Delors, which essentially meant the renewal 
and updating of the Werner plan (CSeMu 
1989); however, this report also provided 
a deep and detailed economic analysis of 
the economic-monetary integration and 
the expected impacts thereof. The delors 
Commission was aware that simultaneously 
with the monetary union, a very strong 
economic policy coordination shall be 
established as well, while the tensions related 
to internal competitiveness shall definitely be 
addressed [see in particular: CSeMu (1989) 
Sections 27–30].
in contracts, the 1990 report of the Com-
mission titled ‘One market, one money’ (eC 
1990) elegantly overlooked the thorough eco-
nomic considerations of the delors plan and 
the risks and necessary measures to be taken 
outlined therein, and basically saw a straight 
line between the establishment of the eMu 
and the community-level efficiency, stabil-
ity and fairness (convergence) (see Figure 2). 
The monetary union was accompanied by this 
type of ‘one-way street’ thinking, and it was 
only the crisis that was able to direct the atten-
tion to the problems related to the monetary 
union, ruthlessly – however, by then, the co-
dependency reached such an extent that keep-
ing the currency zone intact actually proves 
(proved) to be a one-way street.
Through the Maastricht treaty, essentially 
the main elements of the 1989 delors plan 
were incorporated into the primary law. Ac-
cordingly, the treaty established the frame-
works of the economic policy coordination – 
although in respect of the poorly performing 
Member States, the text does not go further 
than the option to make recommendations 
–, and in the end, the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) was not incorporated in the pri-
mary law, it became an intergovernmental 
agreement only. However, the political in-
stitutions of the common monetary policy 
(eCB, eSCB), the main objective (inflation 
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targeting) and instruments thereof were estab-
lished in the treaty. The convergence criteria 
are detailed in one of the protocols attached 
to the treaty; however, legally the protocol is 
also a part of the contract (and thereby of the 
primary law). it is important to note that the 
objectives do not include the aspects related to 
balance of payments. At that time they simply 
did not presume that the balance sheets of the 
Member States could show surplus or deficit 
permanently, thereby creating financing dif-
ferences, which the competitiveness would 
follow in an inflexible manner or not at all. 
Thus, right from the start the plan of the 
eMu specified in the treaty did not include 
the establishment of the monetary union si-
multaneously with the fiscal union and/or 
federalism, not even on the objective-level, it 
only emphasised the importance of economic 
policy coordination, although it was already 
known then that this entails serious risk re-
garding the success and sustainability of the 
project (Sala-i-Martin, Sachs 1991, Rácz, 
2001). it is a lesser known fact that the sign-
ing (7th February 1992) and entry into effect 
(1st November 1993) of the Maastricht treaty 
were so long apart because the united King-
dom and denmark – although in the frame-
work of different political processes – did not 
accept the logic of the treaty, according to 
which if one country complies with the crite-
ria, then it would introduce the single curren-
cy in the next year. Therefore, they ratified the 
treaty only once it was amended by protocols 
on the opt-out right of these two countries.2
during the same period, the eMS went 
through its first crisis, which affected the 
economic thinking of the monetary union as 
well. Previously, the dispute went on between 
‘monetarists’ and ‘economists’: while accord-
ing to the former theory (which was repre-
sented primarily by France), the monetary 
integration facilitates, moreover, brings about 
the convergence, while according to the phi-
losophy of the latter (which was characteristic 
for the Germans) the single currency could be 
merely the coronation of convergence3 (Bini-
Smaghi et al., 1993). A Summer of 1993 sum-
Figure 2
the effects of the emu
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mit managed to solve the exchange rate crisis 
– which started in June 1992 – when at their 
(extended eCOFiN-) meeting, the ministers 
of finance and the presidents of the central 
banks of the eeC decided to expand the +/–
2.25 percent fluctuation band specified in the 
convergence criteria to +/–15 percent, with 
effect from 2nd August 1993 (Horváth, Szalai, 
2012). This meant not only the de facto aboli-
tion of the exchange rate criterion but also the 
impracticability of the ‘coronation theory’ as 
well, and it drew the attention to the impor-
tance of real convergence (the Maastricht con-
vergence criteria are nominal criteria, without 
exception). Anyway, after the entry into effect 
of the Maastricht treaty in November 1993 
– and thus, the formation of the eu –, the 
second phase according to the delors plan 
eventually commenced in 1994. 
As a matter of fact, all these developments 
point to that although the establishment of a 
currency area is based on theoretical economic 
considerations – namely, the theory of opti-
mal currency area (Mundell 1961) –, in the 
case of the euro, almost all of the elements of 
the process were of political character. This is 
understandable from the viewpoint that the 
theory of optimal currency areas offered few 
practical advice in respect of the steps and cir-
cumstances of the establishment – therefore, 
the establishment of the european econom-
ic and monetary union eventually became a 
learning-on-the-go process, so to speak, a real-
time experiment, and thus, it served the fur-
ther development of the theory based on the 
practice (Mongelli, 2008).4 Later, during the 
years of the crisis, this was even more promi-
nent.
Nevertheless, during the first ten years, the 
situation and the prospects had been favour-
able; in particular, on the periphery of the 
currency area, and therein primarily in Por-
tugal, Spain and ireland. it was not apparent 
then how a possible crisis would affect these 
countries (Marimon 2011), although in re-
spect of ireland, it could be presumed that 
the overzealousness would not end well, and 
then an inevitable recession would occur – 
for which, however, ireland did not get pre-
pared (Whelan, 2011). However, in respect of 
Greece, many doubts were expressed as early 
as around its accession in 2001 (Rácz, 2000; 
Baksay, 2005).5 
The single currency brought about the fur-
ther deepening of the integration of the eu-
ropean financial and capital markets as well 
(eCB 2007, Marján 2003). Certain countries 
which became eu members in the eastern 
accession rounds (Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, 
Slovakia) swiftly joined the eurozone as well, 
while others had reservations, for econom-
ic considerations (Bruha, Podpiera, 2007). 
Thus, the crisis that started in 2008 eventually 
reached a 15-member, and then as of 2009, a 
16-member eurozone.
hOw dId ThE CrIsIs aFFECT  
ThE EUrOzONE?
The outbreak and the multiple-year course 
of the global financial and capital market 
crisis starting in 2008 can be considered as a 
milestone in the life of the eurozone. The crisis 
process that dragged on for multiple years is 
considered significant not only in terms of 
that it interrupted the favourable growth trend 
of the zone as an unprecedented economic 
downturn but also because the recovery 
putting an end to the crisis was preceded by a 
more than half a decade of stagnation, and the 
crisis phenomenon triggered the new wave of 
renewal of the common institutional system. 
The crisis made it clear that the economic po-
licy framework existing in the years preceding 
the crisis had been optimised for a growth 
environment fundamentally, expecting the 
Member States to keep the public debt at bay 
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and the budget deficit low, while the common 
monetary institutions had been encouraged 
to fight inflation. The economic policy 
coordination of the integration is ensured in 
the global growth environment only.
The economic stability of the eurozone 
proved to be vulnerable against the external 
asymmetric economic shocks. The years of 
the crisis highlighted the failure of the SPG 
with regard to enforcing fiscal discipline, since 
the excessive deficit procedures became usual 
among the Member States, affecting as many 
as 25 of the 27 Member States in 2010.6 in 
addition, during the years following the cri-
sis, the decade-long objective of the european 
union – namely, the real convergence among 
the Member States – was also at risk: the pro-
cess of reducing the economic differences 
turned around, and new fault lines appeared 
within the economic integration as well, as a 
result of the Southern Member States on the 
periphery falling behind (Pelle,Végh, 2014). 
As a result of the crisis processes, both the 
european economic governance and the com-
mon monetary policy started a continuous in-
stitutional development, which are character-
ised by the emergence of common banking ad 
member stated salvaging institutions, as well 
as the development of the mechanisms of the 
banking union.
However, the differences among the Mem-
ber States experienced during the years of the 
crisis cannot be attributed completely to the 
international economic shock in respect of 
the economic downturn, the recovery and the 
crisis management. The differences among the 
Member States – and thereby the internal im-
balances within the integration – emerged ear-
lier, during the first decade of the euro already, 
since certain markets developed completely 
differently in the Member States. Certain 
Member States – such as Spain or France – 
experienced the permanent increase of the real 
estate prices, while in other Member States, 
the financial sectors became too exposed (see 
ireland or the Netherlands), and in other 
places (Germany, Finland, Austria) the cur-
rent balance of payments showed permanent 
surplus for years. The new development paths 
created by the single currency may also be in-
terpreted as a new division of labour in the 
eurozone; however, the permanent decrease in 
demand affecting the global markets not only 
broke the different development directions 
down but also subjected the Member States 
to significantly different exposure, and made 
the crisis management of each Member States 
substantially more difficult. As Smets (2012) 
pointed it out, in order to manage the crisis 
successfully, the economic decision-makers 
should have noticed the different develop-
ment paths and the risks arising therefrom 
in due time, and should have built the risk 
management mechanisms in the institutional 
system of the economic policy coordination. 
However, the steps to this end can be consid-
ered at least lop-sided, and mostly belated.
The American capital market panic became 
the spark of the global crisis during the Au-
tumn of 2008; however, the united States and 
the european financial market downturn had 
been intensifying already since the previous 
year, from 2007 (Pisani,Ferry, 2014). Moreo-
ver, Bastasin (2012) also highlights that at that 
time the european banking system was func-
tioning not only with higher leverage compared 
to the united States banking system, but the 
large American banks were also managing the 
equity of the european financial institutions, 
thereby realising the losses jointly. The shadow 
banking system – which is difficult to keep in 
check with the classic institutional supervisory 
instruments and risk supervision – emerged as 
an additional risk factor: the process of secu-
ritisation and other financial innovations gain-
ing headway acted as catalyser not only in the 
financial market of the united States during 
the crisis processes but on the markets of the 
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eu as well, connecting seemingly independent 
investments and financial institutions as well, 
thereby enabling the spread of financial infec-
tions (eSRB 2017).
The decision-makers of the eu reacted to 
the first waves of the crisis with the adoption 
of a package which relied on fiscal expansion, 
aimed at the restoration and recovery of de-
mand in terms of Keynesian economics (eB 
2008), and which concentrated mainly on 
loosening the prohibition of state subsidies, 
the expansion of employment, the expan-
sion of state participation (surety, guarantee, 
venture capital transactions) and the develop-
ment of green economy. However, this had 
critics even then [e.g. Schmieding, (2009)], 
who pointed out that the crisis arising from 
the capital market would be stopped only by 
the purification of the capital market (Hetzel, 
2014). in other words, without the introduc-
tion of appropriate bank reconstruction, bank 
salvaging and bankruptcy proceeding mecha-
nisms, the efforts to restore the demand will 
have limited effect, while at the same time, the 
expansion can encumber the fiscal positions of 
the Member States significantly. 
due to its modest budget (compared to its 
GdP), and its limited influence on the fiscal 
policy of the Member States, the eu was un-
able to act as a strong crisis managing actor or 
institution; therefore, the crisis management 
strategies were developed on a Member State 
level – and taking into consideration the in-
terconnection and the mutual co-dependency 
system Member States which were stronger 
than ever before, this proved to be a serious 
mistake. As it was pointed out by Rácz (2009): 
it is problematic that the crisis management 
started on the member state level and not on 
eu or eurozone level, since numerous crisis 
management strategies and attitudes were able 
to become permanent which are beneficial for 
certain strategy-making Member States, and 
which, however, adversely affect the entirety of 
the economic integration, in terms of competi-
tiveness, growth and general integration aspects 
as well. The crisis also highlighted that an un-
tenable situation was created in the eMu as a 
result of the trilemma which became known as 
the ‘triple denial’; namely, that there is (1) no 
exit, (2) no bail-out, and (3) no default regard-
ing the single currency area (Benczes 2011). 
in other words, the failure to build the lessons 
learned from the optimal single currency area 
theories in the mechanisms of the economic 
policy coordination resulted in the wrong path 
and by 2012, a stalemate, as well as the demand 
for international institutional bail-out and the 
risk of permanent social disaster.
Financial crises usually have heterogeneous 
consequences, and this remained to be true 
in the case of the eMu as well: the members 
of the economic integration showed differ-
ent effectiveness in absorbing the asymmetric 
shocks. The necessary crisis management was 
largely influenced by the fiscal position of the 
Member State concerned, as well as its finan-
cial opportunities to execute expansive opera-
tions. The Member States were able to inter-
vene in the functioning of the real economy 
or the capital markets accordingly, through 
ad hoc bank bail-outs or capital adequacy 
regulations. However, the scope of influenc-
ing factors did not end here: for example, the 
Central and eastern european Member States 
realised capital flights, since the Western par-
ent banks ordered back their outstanding cap-
ital (these processes were made significantly 
more untraceable by the cross-border shadow 
banking system characteristics). in addition, 
the liquidity weakness of those Member States 
which had permanent balance of payment or 
capital deficit caused difficulties at the treasury 
bond auctions, highlighting that a dependen-
cy system among the Member States had also 
emerged over the previous decades, which was 
also disregarded by the institutional system of 
the eMu. 
 StudieS 
Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1 135
By 2011, Greece, and then by 2012, Por-
tugal, Spain and italy were faced with high 
yield expectations which entailed serious refi-
nancing risks. The solvency difficulties of the 
Member States spread like an infection among 
the Member States, which directed the inter-
est of investors towards the treasury bonds 
of the core countries which promised steady 
yields; therefore, such countries were able to 
finance their own treasury bonds with even 
more favourable conditions. Overall, it can be 
established that the countries of the eurozone 
were forced to go down on very different cri-
sis management paths along the lines of their 
previous economic structure characteristics, 
fiscal positions and economic traditions, while 
facing a kind of path dependency (Kiss, Szilá-
gyi, 2014).
Certain eurozone Member States suffered 
from the lack of independent monetary policy 
during the crisis: the South european euro-
zone members lost a lot of their competitive-
ness – mostly compared to German – due to 
the fact that they did not have the instrument 
of currency devaluation (tarafás, 2013). in 
addition, it can also be established that only 
one eu Member State – Poland – did not suf-
fer GdP decrease during the crisis, owing – 
among others – to its active currency devalu-
ation policy. Meanwhile, the Member States 
which belonged to the eurozone had a debt 
denominated in a currency which they were 
essentially unable to influence directly, the 
same as if they had been indebted in a foreign 
currency (Krugman, 2012). However, the ad-
vantages before the crisis – favourable interest 
environment and low inflation – turned op-
posite at this point, putting the peripheral, 
highly indebted Member States in an espe-
cially difficult situation. in respect of the crisis 
states, the international creditors (eCB, eu-
ropean Commission and the iMF) enforced a 
strongly technocratic approach which focused 
on financial crisis management, to the detri-
ment of the democratic self-determination of 
the countries, and desperately trying to restore 
the solvency and balance of the budget of the 
Member States (Győrffy, 2013). Thus, as parts 
of the single currency area the sovereign coun-
tries became vulnerable and required interna-
tional assistance. This assistance was intended 
to be financed by the other members of the 
eurozone, through the institution of the eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism (eSM) set up in 
2012. Although the acceptance and formation 
of the institution were realised slowly – al-
though it meant progress compared to its pre-
decessor, the eFSF7 –, it still fails to acknowl-
edge the conflict of the vulnerability and the 
democratic self-determination of the Member 
States to the sufficient extent and in the ad-
equate manner (de Grauwe, 2011).
Naturally, the system of phenomena de-
scribed above posed a multifaceted challenged 
to the monetary cooperation institutional en-
vironment as well. The ministers of foreign af-
fairs of the 11 eu Member States published a 
report in 2012, calling themselves the Future 
of europe Group. in this report, they empha-
sised that the restoration of the eurozone shall 
enjoy primary priority in the eu, and all the 
other areas of the integration shall only fol-
low this restoration. With regard to the resto-
ration, they thought that the solution lay in 
that the legal obligations and consequences 
related to the rules of the economic policy co-
ordination shall be strengthened (Foe, 2012). 
in 2014, it seemed like the Greek crisis man-
agement was successful and no further financ-
ing would be necessary (iMF, 2014), and an 
optimistic professional analysis was prepared 
even in July 2015 (iMF, 2015a), only for the 
opinion on the debt to deteriorate to the point 
of complete unsustainability after the referen-
dum of 5th July 2015 (iMF, 2015b). The eco-
nomic growth of Greece recovered only by 
2016; however, it still lost more than 25 per-
cent of its pre-crisis GdP, and it is the matter 
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of decades until it will be able to achieve the 
pre-crisis issue amount again. The prospects 
of the other countries which were given inter-
national assistance (Cyprus, Portugal, ireland 
and Spain) are more favourable; however, they 
represent an alarming precedent regarding the 
future development directions of the eMu.
The new step of the monetary cooperation 
is the institution of the banking union, which 
is intended to stop the viscous cycle of bank 
bail-outs and the bail-outs of the states. Parts 
of the concept are the SSM (Single Superviso-
ry Mechanism), the SRM (Single Resolution 
Mechanism) and the ediS (european deposit 
insurance scheme), and – as the foundation 
of all three institutions – the single banking 
rulebook. The purpose of these institution is 
to eliminate the fragmentation of the bank-
ing system of the area – this may be the right 
direction in terms of that it targets the real 
reasons of the capital market crisis which 
started in 2008, and the functional anoma-
lies of the banking system. Namely, instead 
of emergency action-like bail-outs, the bank-
ing union concentrates on establishing a more 
systematic institutional system operation 
which focuses on preventing crises in the fu-
ture. The single, fragmentation free eurozone 
capital market would allow the mechanisms of 
the market to regulate the unique paths of de-
velopment of the economies themselves, with 
sanctioning riskier economic operation with 
higher yield expectations, thereby contribut-
ing to the faster elimination of the economic 
anomalies (eB, 2014).
ThE CUrrENT sITUaTION aNd PlaNs 
After the last year of the crisis, 2013, growth 
reoccurred in the eurozone (see Figure 3), and 
although the pre-crisis growth rate of more 
Figure 3
reaL gDP growth in the eurozone (eur-19), in the Percentage  
of the Previous year, 2006–2017
Source: Eurostat [tec00115]
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than 3 percent is not typical to this day, the 
growth had been around 2 percent for the 
third year by 2017. 
The business confidence indexes were also 
restored, although the index for the eurozone 
reached the similar complete indicator of the 
eu a few years later, by mid-2016, and since 
december 2017, the trend has been slightly 
decreasing again (see Figure 4). 
The crisis affected the eu objective re-
lated to increase of employment (which was 
expressed first in 2000 in Lisbon, and then 
confirmed in 2005 in the renewed Lisbon 
Strategy) as well: the previous growth trend 
turned to drastically decreasing from 2008 to 
2009, and during the crisis – considering the 
entirety of the eurozone –, in no year could it 
be turned in a positive direction again or even 
stop the decrease significantly (see Figure 5). 
The employment objective reappeared among 
the priorities of the europe 2020 strategy 
adopted in March 2010 (eC 2010), i.e. em-
ployment rate should reach 75 percent in the 
20–64 age group by 2020. By now, the trend 
has been positive since 2013, and in respect of 
the entirety of the eu, the employment rate 
was 72.2 percent – and 71 percent in the eu-
rozone – in 2017, and it already reached or ex-
ceeded the eu-level objective in some Mem-
ber States.8 The largest growths compared to 
2006 were achieved in Malta (+15 percentage 
points), in Poland (+10.8 percentage points), 
in Hungary (+10.7 percentage points) and in 
Germany (+8 percentage points).9 
The european Commission last published 
an economic forecast during the Summer of 
2018 (eC 2018). in this forecast it was point-
ed out that after five years of expansion, the 
pace of the economic growth started to slow 
down – primarily due to the world trade ten-
sions, the increasing oil prices and the politi-
cal instability of certain Member States – ; 
Figure 4
Business confiDence inDex in the eu anD the eurozone, (Long-term 
average=100%), January 1993 – sePtemBer 2018
Source: Own edited based on the EU Economic sentiment Indicator (EsI) database
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however, this could regain momentum again 
to some extent, considering that the labour 
market conditions are improving, the indebt-
edness of households is decreasing, and the 
monetary policy is supporting the growth. 
Preserving and regenerating the internal 
cohesion of the eu and the eurozone seems 
like a bigger challenge. The pre-crisis con-
vergence came to a halt upon the crisis, at 
least (Pelle, 2017). After the crisis, it is still 
not clear whether the internal differences can 
be reduced again. With regard the future of 
the single currency zone overcoming the cri-
sis and the plans related thereto, it was the 
Four Presidents’ report (Van Rompuy et al., 
2012) that first laid down the tasks of the es-
tablishment of the original, genuine eMu, 
primarily by detailing, sectioning the progress 
to the ‘one-way street’ which has been in the 
field of view of the Commission since 1990. 
Similarly, a few years later, the by then Five 
Presidents’ report (Juncker et al., 2015) cov-
ered the same topic, further expanding the at-
tributes of the eMu, i.e. it shall be deep and 
fair as well. At the eu Summit in the Summer 
of 2016, the plan for establishing the banking 
union was drawn up as well (Coeu 2016), 
without setting a specific deadline (the Four 
then Five Presidents’ report contained itiner-
aries built on a timeline; however, by then, it 
was apparent that the timing does not depend 
on the intentions of the european union in-
stitutions).
The White Paper of March 2017 (eC, 
2017a) shall be mentioned as the next step, 
in which the Commission outlined five sce-
narios regarding the post-Brexit eu. each 
scenario has an element related specifically to 
the eMu (See Table 1). The second and the 
fourth scenarios received the most criticism – 
the former because it is actually the reversal 
of the integration and therefore would mean 
Figure 5
emPLoyment rate in the eurozone (eur-19), in the Percentage  
of the 20–64 age grouP, 2006–2017
Source: Eurostat [tesem010]
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disintegration on the long run; while the lat-
ter was criticised because it is hard to imagine 
how it should be understood on the level of 
policy-making, decision-making and everyday 
functioning.
The White Paper was followed by differ-
ent additional documents (so-called reflection 
papers), in which the experts of the Com-
mission explained certain topics more thor-
oughly. One of these, the document on the 
eMu (eC, 2017b) finally pays attention to 
the internal differences of the eu and the eu-
rozone; in particular, to unemployment, the 
interest rate and debt levels (examining both 
the community and the private debts in re-
spect of the latter). The report establishes that 
a future shock would be expected to affect the 
Member States to very different extents, and 
the reduction of debt – in respect of those 
Member States where it is task – is a time-
consuming process. Pursuant to the challeng-
es established, the Commission recommends 
that the efficiency and the transparency of the 
eMu governance be increased, and that its 
institutional system be clarified. The analysis 
points out the inadequacies of the institution-
al system; namely, that the representation of 
the interest of the eurozone is inadequate in 
public debates and decision-making. in our 
opinion, this inadequacy arises from the de-
viation from the original state that after nearly 
twenty years, the single currency zone is still 
only an actual subset of the eu. We think that 
the following recommendations of the report 
are worth mentioning:
•	the eMu shall be kept open for all eu 
Member States in the future as well,
•	the appropriate sequencing of the 
steps of the development is important 
(sequencing),
•	the risks shall be decreased and distributed 
simultaneously (in the framework of 
this the european Semester should pay 
attention to the condition of the financial 
sector as well),
•	the establishment of the banking union 
shall be completed, and similarly the 
capital market union as well,
•	re-convergence shall be realised in the 
more integrated economic and fiscal 
union (re-convergence).
However, the report failed to actually 
come up with substantial ideas in the inter-
est of the success of the convergence process 
Table 1
the emu-reLateD effects of the march 2017  
white PaPer
scenario ‘carrying on’ ‘nothing but the 
single market’
‘those who 







Effect on the EMU gradual 
establishment in 
the operation of the 
eurozone
The cooperation 









the eurozone, less 
economic policy 
coordination on the 
EU-27 level
Economic, 
financial and fiscal 
union
Source: Edited by the authors based on EC 2017 data
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to be renewed. The Commission could be de-
scribed as repeating (also in this umpteenth 
document) in a mantra-like manner that the 
framework of the european integration and 
the existing system of regulations are suitable 
for ensuring convergence – accordingly, the 
Commission recommends the strengthening 
of these frameworks and rules only, and it 
disregards why complying with the rules has 
not been working for a number of years al-
ready –; namely, there are differences rooted 
deeply in the quality of governance all over 
the eu (Benczes, Rezesssy, 2013).  On the 
other hand, it is also a fact that no one has 
ever been ‘kicked out’ of the club for failing 
to comply with the rules – and actually every-
body knows this (Kübler, 2012). However, we 
should see (more) specific plans in the interest 
of strengthening the stabilising capacity/func-
tion brought up already in the Five Presidents’ 
report: one of them includes the establishment 
of a european investment Protection Scheme, 
while the other the european unemployment 
Reinsurance Scheme.
in addition to the Commission, other also 
came up with plans regarding the future of the 
eurozone. The plan of French president Em-
manuel Macron (The economist 2017) may 
be considered as the most important, due to 
the specifics and the (presumed) political sup-
port behind it. The key elements of the Ma-
cron plan: the complete establishment of the 
banking union, progress in the establishment 
of the capital market union, establishment of 
the new european Monetary Fund, as well 
as the formation of the eurozone minister of 
budget and finance position.10 especially the 
latter (two) had garnered large response, since 
it (those) would essentially mean the establish-
ment of a eurozone institutional system paral-
lel with the eu institutions, or at least the ini-
tial steps of such establishment. With regard to 
Macron’s plan Grant (2018) pointed out that 
the real challenge lies in the differences of the 
French and German ways of thinking about 
the single currency area, which will be diffi-
cult to overcome, no matter the political tal-
ent. Brunnermeier et al. (2016) formulate this 
problem, saying that while Germany sees the 
Maastricht treaty as a system of regulations to 
be complied with, France sees the same as the 
flexible framework of the political cooperation 
of the Member State governments. Thus, we 
can establish that although along the lines of 
different criteria – such as in the convergence 
debate back then –, the single currency area 
is currently being strained by a French – Ger-
man difference of opinion after all. 
Simultaneously with the political nego-
tiations, fourteen German and French econ-
omists (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018)11 also 
outlined their common ideas on how the dif-
ferences of the German and the French way 
of economic thinking could be handled well 
in respect of the development of the eMu. 
The starting point of the analysis of the au-
thors is that the eurozone is still vulnerable, 
divided and it is not functioning well enough, 
which in the end is in no one’s interest. in or-
der to eliminate the inadequacies, the incen-
tive system influencing the Member States 
shall be modified, and the financial sector 
(bank bail-outs, regulation, deepening the in-
vestment protection and the cross-border fi-
nancial integration), the fiscal architecture of 
the single currency area (decreasing the pro-
cyclicality, increasing national commitment 
and economic policy interest), as well as the 
institutional system of the eMu (independ-
ent supervisory authority, conditional lending 
in case of crisis) shall be reformed. According 
to the authors, in order to achieve the latter, 
the ‘fiscal capacity’ of the eurozone shall be 
increased; however, the documents avoids the 
expression ‘eurozone budget’, and refers to a 
euro area fund instead.
in order to harmonise the French and 
German reform plans, French president Ma-
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cron met German chancellor Merkel in June 
2018, in the Meseberg Palace near Berlin. Af-
ter their meeting, the two heads of state is-
sued the so-called Meseberg declaration (BR 
2018) jointly, in which – among a lot of oth-
ers – they made comments and recommenda-
tions concerning the eMu as well (after all, 
the declaration details this point the most). 
With regard to the eSM, the two heads of 
state recommend the amendment of the in-
tergovernmental fundamental treaty thereof, 
with the incorporation of a joint support, the 
improvement of the efficiency of the preven-
tive measures, and increasing the role of the 
mechanism in the course of the evaluation 
and monitoring of the future programmes 
(BR 2018). According to them, in the course 
of the reform of the eSM, the framework of 
liquidity support and shall also be improved 
in case of bank bail-out, as well as the order 
of lending in case of assistance. On the longer 
term, the two heads of state recommend that 
the eSM treaty is made into a part of the 
eu law, and the fund be renamed possibly;12 
however, they emphasise the principle of con-
ditionality related to assistance, which shall 
not be foregone.13
The most important concept of the declara-
tion related to the banking union is that the 
eSM would serve as the support for the sin-
gle bank bail-out (Single Resolution), and this 
support (backstop) would be close to the ex-
tent of the Single Resolution Fund, and there-
by it could replace the direct recapitalisation 
instrument. Otherwise, the joint declaration 
confirms the 2016 eCOFiN itinerary for the 
establishment of the banking union. Calling 
the eurozone budget by its name is a large step 
forward by the two heads of state, and which 
they recommend to be launched in 2021, in 
order to ensure competitiveness, convergence 
and stability in the eurozone. in their opin-
ion, the common budget of the zone shall be 
developed taking into consideration the mul-
tiple-year financial framework between 2021 
and 2027. The budget of the zone would be 
set up by the Member States thereof, while the 
amount of the budget would be determined in 
multiple-year cycles. The competitiveness and 
the convergence would be ensured through 
investments to be made in innovation and 
human capital – in these fields the budget of 
the eurozone could finance investments and 
could also serve as substitute for the national 
budgetary expenditures in these respects. The 
execution of the decisions on expenditures 
would belong to the power and responsibil-
ity of the european Commission (BR 2018) 
– the eurozone minister of finance (and any 
kind of parallel institutional system) is there-
fore no longer included in the joint concept of 
the two heads of state.
The ministers of finance of14 the North-
ern eu Member States rushed to lessen the 
French-German reform spirit in a joint dec-
laration (VM 2018). They start their critique 
by that the negotiations on the future of the 
eMu shall be conducted in the framework of 
an inclusive process – and those among the 
post-Brexit eu-27. Secondly, however, they 
emphasise (consistently with the Commis-
sion) that the eMu is a rule-based system, 
and its strength and stability lies in that the 
rules are observed by everybody. Third, they 
declare that the conversation shall be about 
initiatives which enjoy widespread social sup-
port in the Member States, and which actu-
ally contribute to the strength of the eMu. At 
the same time, they express their unwavering 
commitment to finishing the establishment of 
the banking union, and they think it is pos-
sible that the eSM develops into a european 
Monetary Fund (eMF) in the future.
in respect of the near future, the permis-
sive American fiscal policy, the conclusion of 
the quantitative easing (Anstey, 2018, eCB, 
2018), and the withdrawal of money are ex-
pected to have an inflationary effect, which is 
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presumed to burden the eu Member States 
to different extents again. The inflation of 
the countries using the euro will presumably 
remain lower, and the own currencies are ex-
pected to get weaker. The process will contin-
ue for the next two to three years. After the 
multiple-year booming period, the monetary 
tightening will presumably be accompanied 
by economic downturns as well, against which 
those will be able to act who has any reserve 
in the budgetary position. When ‘bad times’ 
come, the eSM-like assistance will come in 
handy for the countries – however, all these 
remain to be seen.
rEsUlTs, CONClUsIONs
The need to establish the european monetary 
union emerged as early as the end of the 1960s; 
however, it was realised only in the 1990s. The 
competition of the original concepts related to 
the establishment was already decided by the 
eMS crisis at the beginning of the ‘90s: the 
coronation theory (Krönungstheorie) – which 
was of German origin – failed, and thereby 
the ‘monetarist’ approach of the French – 
according to which the monetary integration 
will eventually bring about the convergence – 
remained in force; however, as a matter of fact, 
this theory was weakened by the crisis as well, 
at least in respect of the half-finished eMu, 
since the downturn resulted in the periphery 
lagging behind drastically. All in all, the eMu 
is still strained by a kind of French-German 
difference in the way of economic thinking, 
although the subject thereof has by now shif-
ted into the dimension of the relationship 
with the framework regulations.
usually, financial crises affect countries 
differently, i.e. the risk of asymmetric shocks 
always lies in them. However, the differences 
between the Member States of the eMu – 
which later provided each Member State with 
significantly different conditions and pros-
pects related to the crisis management of the 
eurozone (primarily the core and peripheric 
countries) – have in fact already been formed 
during the first decade of the euro; however, at 
that time – although they had been noticed –, 
nobody really minded these imbalances, since 
the economic upturn and the advantages aris-
ing from the monetary union and enjoyed by 
everybody concealed the risks.
The ‘one-way street’ approach has been 
characteristic throughout the decades of the 
monetary integration; however, in reality, si-
multaneously with the deepening of the inte-
gration, the eMu actually proves (proved) to 
be a one-way street, and exiting it serves the 
interest of neither the possible exiting states, 
nor the single currency area, but conversely: 
keeping the area intact at all cost seems to be 
to only feasible, politically and economically 
tenable option. This type of determination 
has only become even more obvious through 
the crisis, while at the same time, it caused 
dependency on this option as well, both for 
the entirety of the single currency area and 
the Member States thereof – in respect of the 
latter, the position proves to be crucial, i.e. 
whether the country concerned belongs to the 
core or the periphery of the eu and the eu-
rozone.
The largest ‘stress test’ of the eMu so far 
was definitively the eurozone crisis following 
the global crisis, in the course of which the 
crisis management measures first concentrated 
on the solution of individual, country-specif-
ic problems. They tried to introduce general 
mechanisms only when they were no longer 
really necessary (see eSM). On the other 
hand, as a result of the european union-level 
measures and the institutional developments, 
the eurozone became more resistant to crises. 
However, overall the crisis management in-
struments used do not facilitate the realisation 
of the purpose of the eMu, but the crisis-re-
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sistance of thereof, and the achievement of the 
former is still to come.
in summation, the now more than 25-
year history of the eMu – which started in 
Maastricht – points out that although the 
effective establishment and management of 
the monetary integration which was built 
on – partially competing – theoretical con-
siderations, and then leading the monetary 
integration out of the crisis always happened 
in the framework of a political process, it is 
actually understandable, since an integra-
tion of this depth might not be feasible and 
operable without political commitment. We 
could also see that the technocratic approach 
of the international creditors during the cri-
sis met with a strong social opposition in the 
countries concerned, and it provided ammu-
nition to political changes which adversely 
affected the european integration (euroscep-
ticism, objection to the existing regime). Ac-
cordingly, it is advisable to evaluate the ideas 
about the future of the eMu in light of all of 
the above, i.e. from the constellations which 
are basically functional within the economic 
theoretical framework, the versions which 
are politically executable on the GMu and 
the entire eu level shall be selected and com-
mitted to, and then the execution thereof 
shall commence, in order to ensure in a reas-
suring manner that the single currency area 
is sustainable.
Notes
1 This research was supported by project No eFOP-
3.6.2-16-2017-00007, titled ‘Aspects on the 
development of intelligent, sustainable and inclusive 
society: social, technological, innovation networks 
in employment and digital economy’. The project 
is supported by the european union, co-financed 
by the european Social Fund and the Hungarian 
budget.
2 Protocol on certain provisions relating to the 
united Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
ireland; Protocol on certain provisions relating to 
denmark.
3 Therefore, this approach was named Krönung-
stheorie.
4 Magnusson and Stråth (2001), as well as James 
(2002) explain the events in detail in this spirit.
5 in her december 2000 article, Margit Rácz said 
(p. 9): ‘With regard to the emergence of trust in the 
euro, it is uncertain whether the Greek accession can 
be considered particularly positive. Greece is not one 
of the eu Member States which have the so-called 
culture of stability.’ Meanwhile, Gergely Baksay 
called Greece the ‘back sheep of the eMu’ in 2005 
(p. 166).
6 The erosion of the SGP was actually started by 
Germany and France in 2003, when they mutually 
voted against the excessive deficit procedures to be 
initiated against them in the eu Council (Peet, 
La Guardia 2014). With their decisions they 
created a precedent for discretionality, and also 
caused the smaller Member States (e.g. Portugal) 
to think that ‘the big ones can do anything’, while 
‘the small ones’ are coerced into compliance with 
the community rules. it is uncertain whether the 
conflict of the european Commission and italy – 
which started during the Autumn of 2018 – will 
have such an aspect, since italy is the third largest 
economy of the eurozone and the post-Brexit eu-
27, right behind the already mentioned Germany 
and France.
7 eFSF: european Financial Stability Facility, the early 
crisis management fund of the eurozone.
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